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Inequality decomposition techniques are used to analyze the different impacts of 
domestic and international remittances on household income inequality in the 
Dominican Republic. Domestic remittances seem more likely to be equalizing 
than international remittances. The negative marginal effect on inequality of 
domestic remittances is more prominent among rural households, and in 
particular among landless rural households, while the negative marginal effect 
on inequality of international remittances is more prominent among urban 
households, and in particular outside of the Santo Domingo area. Stronger 
marginal effects of remittances were found among female-headed households, 
the elderly and the less educated. Both domestic and international remittances 
are higher among female-headed households and the elderly. Education is 
associated with lower domestic remittances and higher international remittances, 
probably reflecting the role of education in promoting international versus 
domestic migration. An increase in schooling increases inequality through 
domestic remittances and decreases inequality through international remittances, 
while a reduction in household size reduces inequality through both domestic 
and international remittances. This analysis highlights the importance of the 
distinction between domestic and international remittances as drivers of 
inequality as well as the importance of identifying and quantifying the 
determinants of remittances and their subsequent impact on inequality.  
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  1Introduction 
Despite evidence for negative impact of out-migration on the economy due to 
brain drain (Adams, 2003), remittances from migrants have contributed significantly 
to income in sending communities. Adams and Page (2005) have shown that an 
increase in international remittances reduces poverty in developing countries. 
However, other studies have found both positive and negative effects of remittances 
on poverty and inequality in various countries (Taylor, 1999; Acosta et al., 2008). 
Theoretically, remittances are likely to increase inequality at initial stages of the 
migration process and increase inequality at later stages (Özden and Schiff, 2006; 
Rapoport and Docquier, 2006). This prediction is supported by the empirical findings 
of Stark, Taylor and Yitzhaki (1986, 1988) and Taylor et al. (2005). The latter also 
differentiated between domestic and international remittances, and showed that they 
had different effects on inequality and poverty in rural Mexico. 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of domestic and 
international remittances on household income inequality in the Dominican Republic. 
Despite impressive growth performance since about 1970, poverty and inequality 
remain important issues in the Dominican Republic, with 42% of the population 
below the poverty line in 2004 (World Bank, 2006). The country has a rich history of 
rural-to-urban migration as well as international out-migration, especially to the U.S. 
(Pessar, 1982). International remittances have increased dramatically since the mid-
1980s to more than 10% of GNP (figure 1), and are conceived as a potentially 
equalizing income source. However, the Gini index of inequality hardly changed over 
the years (figure 1). Fajnzylber and Lopez (2008) even found that the observed Gini 
index in the Dominican Republic is slightly higher that what it would have been 
without migration and remittances. They used a comparison of the actual and 
counterfactual income distributions, with the latter based on simulating household 
incomes in the absence of migration and remittances, and did not distinguish between 
domestic and international remittances. While total remittances as a fraction of 
household income was roughly constant across income quintiles in the Dominican 
Republic in 1998, the share of international remittances in total remittances was 60% 
in the highest quintile but only 20% in the lowest quintile (World Bank, 2000). 
Therefore, the distinction between domestic and international remittances is very 
important for the analysis of inequality. 
  2This paper uses inequality decomposition techniques in order to obtain 
marginal effects of domestic and international remittances on inequality, a method 
that has been applied to other countries before (e.g., Stark, Taylor and Yitzhaki, 1986). 
Two decomposition rules are used. Shorrocks (1982) and Fields (2003) suggested that 
the squared coefficient of variation has superior theoretical properties. On the other 
hand, the decomposition of the Gini index of inequality is more intuitively appealing 
and offers an analytic formula for the marginal effects (Lerman and Yitzhaki, 1985). 
Previous research has shown that the results of the two decomposition rules are 
mostly but not always consistent (Shorrocks, 1983; Morduch and Sicular, 2002; 
Kimhi, 2007). This paper compares the results of the two rules, by obtaining marginal 
effects for the squared CV rule using a simulation exercise. 
The next section describes the methodology of inequality decomposition by 
income sources. The following section presents the decomposition results and the 
marginal effects. After that we analyze the determinants of remittances and their 
inequality implications. Subsequently, we decompose the contributions of remittances 




  Shorrocks (1982,1983) suggested focusing on inequality measures that can be 
written as a weighted sum of incomes: 
 
(1)   I(y) = Σiai(y)yi,  
 
where ai are the weights, yi is the income of household i, and y is the vector of 
household incomes. If income is observed as the sum of incomes from k different 
sources, yi=Σkyi









Dividing (2) through by I(y), one obtains the proportional contribution of income 
source k to overall inequality as: 
 




Shorrocks (1982) noted that the decomposition procedure (3) yields an infinite 
number of potential decomposition rules for each inequality index, because in 
principle, the weights ai(y) can be chosen in numerous ways, so that the proportional 
contribution assigned to any income source can be made to take any value between 
minus and plus infinity. He further showed how additional intuitive restrictions on the 
choice of weights can reduce the number of potential decomposition rules, and came 
up with a unique decomposition rule based on the squared coefficient of variation 
inequality index. Fields (2003) reached the same conclusion in a different way. 
However, Shorrocks (1983) still suggested not to rely solely on this decomposition 
rule in empirical analyses.  
The decomposition results indicate how changes in the variability of income 
from each source are likely to affect total income inequality (Kimhi, 2007). Perhaps a 
more policy-relevant result is the impact on inequality of a uniform change in a 
particular income source. Shorrocks (1983) has noted that comparing s
k, the 
contribution of income source k to inequality, and μ
k/μ, the income share of source k, 
is useful for knowing whether the k
th income source is equalizing or disequalizing. 
Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985) have shown that the relative change in the Gini 




(2007) has shown that a similar result can be obtained for other inequality measures, 
including the squared coefficient of variation, using simulations. 
 
Inequality impacts of domestic and international remittances 
The data used in this research is obtained from the 1992 Family Expenditure 
Survey in the Dominican Republic. The survey included about 1,200 households. 
Besides detailed income and expenditure data, it included demographic and socio-
economic data such as age, education, and labor supply of all household members, 
detailed information on agricultural activities, and indices of living conditions. The 
first column in table 1 shows the distribution of per-capita income across income 
sources. Labor income comprises the lion's share of per-capita income, with capital 
income (pensions, insurance and interest) in second place. Domestic remittances 
account for only one percent of per-capita income, while international remittances 
account for six percent. 
  4The last two columns in table 1 show the inequality decomposition results 
(top) and marginal effects (bottom). The decomposition results show that the relative 
contributions of the income sources roughly correspond to their income shares. The 
two decomposition rules mostly agree on these relative contributions, with the 
exception of family business income, which accounts for 13% of inequality under the 
Gini decomposition rule and 30% under the squared CV rule. The contribution of 
domestic remittances to inequality is negative. This implies that an increase in the 
variance of domestic remittances is expected to reduce income inequality. Given that 
domestic remittances are much more important for poor households (World Bank, 
2000), this result is expected. The contribution of international remittances, on the 
other hand, is positive. 
  The marginal effects show the percentage impact on inequality of a uniform 
one-percent increase in each income source. Here we find differences in statistical 
significance across the two decomposition rules. The income sources that have 
positive marginal effects on inequality are self-employment, family business, and 
pensions, insurance and interest income. However, these marginal effects are 
statistically significant only under the Gini decomposition rule. The negative marginal 
effects of wage labor and agricultural income are statistically significant under both 
decomposition rules, and the same is true for domestic remittances. International 
remittances also have a negative marginal effect, but this effect is statistically 
significant only under the square CV decomposition rule. Moreover, the marginal 
effect of domestic remittances is nine times larger than the marginal effect of 
international remittances (in absolute value) under the Gini decomposition rule, but it 
is 60% smaller under the squared CV decomposition rule. 
  The results are therefore quite vague with respect to the relative contributions 
to inequality of domestic and international remittances. However, it is pretty clear that 
uniform increases in remittances are likely to reduce income inequality. In fact, when 
the analysis was repeated with total remittances rather than differentiating between 
domestic and international remittances, the marginal effect of remittances on 
inequality was significantly negative under both decomposition rules. Combining the 
decomposition results and the marginal effects, we can say that an increase in 
domestic remittances is likely to reduce inequality unless the increase is concentrated 
among households with the lowest levels of domestic remittances (which are likely to 
be richer overall). An increase in international remittances, on the other hand, is likely 
  5to reduce inequality only if it is concentrated among households with the lowest levels 
of international remittances (which are likely to be poor). The impact of changes in 
domestic and international migration on income inequality in the Dominican Republic 
should be evaluated differentially according to these results. 
 
Differentiating by population sub-groups 
  To delve deeper into the issue of differential effects of domestic and 
international remittances, we recall that the relative importance of domestic and 
international remittances is not homogeneous across population sub-groups. In 
particular, domestic remittances are more important as a source of income for poor 
households, while international remittances are more important for richer households 
(World Bank, 2000). Poverty and inequality are also not homogeneous across 
population sub-groups. In particular, they have a strong geographic dimension (World 
Bank, 2006). Table 2 shows the relative importance of income sources to household 
income of different population sub-groups. Comparing urban and rural households, 
we find that relatively more rural households enjoy domestic remittances, while many 
more urban households enjoy international remittances. This is explained by the 
inability of poor rural households to afford sending a migrant out of the country, and 
by the fact that many urban households are already residing not far from a well-
developed labor market, hence domestic migration is not relevant for them. This last 
argument is supported by the fact that among urban households, fewer households 
enjoy domestic remittances in the Santo Domingo area (the major urban center in the 
country) than elsewhere. We also find that among rural households, households with 
land (which are supposedly more affluent) are more likely to enjoy domestic 
remittances than landless households, and the fraction of their international 
remittances out of total income is twice as high as the same fraction for landless 
households.  
Another population sub-group that seems to be unique with respect to the 
composition of income is female-headed households. These households are much 
more likely to obtain domestic and international remittances, and the fraction of 
remittances in total household income is also much higher. It could be that the mere 
fact that many of these households are headed by a female is a result of the migration 
of the male spouse either domestically or internationally. Differentiating by 
households according to the age of the head of household, we find that older 
  6households are more likely to obtain remittances, and the difference is particularly 
notable with respect to domestic remittances. Similar differences are observed with 
respect to the share of remittances out of total household income. Finally, 
differentiating by households according to the schooling of the head of household, we 
find that more educated households are less likely to obtain domestic remittances and 
more likely to obtain international remittances. Despite that, the share of international 
remittances out of total household income is lower in more educated households. 
  It would thus be interesting to look at the differential marginal effects of 
income from domestic and international remittances on inequality for each population 
sub-group. Table 3 shows simulated marginal effects of uniform increases in 
remittances broken down by those same population sub-groups that were presented in 
table 2. Comparing rural and urban households, we observe that using the Gini 
inequality index, the negative marginal effect of domestic remittances is much larger 
for rural than for urban households. However, the marginal effect on the squared CV 
inequality index is split almost evenly between these sub-groups. On the other hand, 
the marginal effect of international remittances is much larger (in absolute value) 
among urban households, using the squared CV inequality index. The marginal 
effects under the Gini index are not statistically significant. This is consistent with our 
earlier result that domestic remittances are more important for rural households, while 
international remittances are more important for urban households. 
  The marginal effects of remittances among rural households are further broken 
down to households with land and landless households. It is easy to see that the 
negative marginal effects of both domestic and international remittances are larger in 
absolute value among landless households, for both inequality measures. The 
marginal effects of remittances among urban households are further broken down to 
households in the Santo Domingo area and in other areas. We find that marginal 
effects of remittances in the Santo Domingo area are weaker than in other urban areas, 
and the marginal effect of international remittances on the Gini inequality index even 
becomes positive for these households. 
  Looking at female-headed and male-headed households, we find that the 
negative marginal effects of remittances on inequality are stronger for female-headed 
households. Although the differences in table 3 do not seem to be impressive, note 
that female-headed households are less than a quarter of all households (table 2), and 
hence their relative marginal effects are indeed stronger. Differentiating by the age of 
  7head of household, we find that the negative marginal effect of domestic remittances 
is stronger for older households, while the marginal effects of international 
remittances do not seem to vary by the age of head of household. Differentiating by 
the schooling of head of household, we find that the marginal effects of domestic 
remittances are consistently and significantly negative only for lower-educated 
households. This difference is also observed with respect to international remittances, 
but in this case it is not very consistent across the two inequality measures. 
  The results of this simulation exercise imply that while the equalizing nature 
of uniform increases in remittances is valid for almost all population sub-groups, it is 
stronger for population sub-groups that are comprised of relatively low-income 
households, such as rural landless households, urban households outside of the Santo-
Domingo area, female-headed households, and the less educated. This implies that 
understanding the determinants of both rural-to-urban and international migration of 
low-income households is critical to the design of inequality-reducing policy 
measures. For example, education is known to be an important determinant of 
migration (Adams, 2003), although its effect varies considerably across countries 
(Acosta et al., 2008). If education stimulates migration, as seems to be the case for the 
Dominican Republic, then enhancing education among poorer households could have 
an equalizing effect on income through its effect on remittances. In the next section, 
we attempt to identify the determinants of remittances and their inequality 
implications. 
 
The determinants of remittances and their inequality implications 
  A regression analysis is used to identify and quantify the effects of the 
determinants of remittances. Per-capita domestic and international remittances are 
analyzed separately, and a Tobit model is used since both types of remittances are 
censored from below at zero. The results are in table 4. The models were estimated 
with and without a log-transformation of the dependent variables. The results were 
not too different, therefore only the log-transformation results are presented. The 
results show that both domestic and international remittances are higher in female-
headed households and in households in which the head of household is older. 
Schooling, on the other hand, affects domestic remittances negatively and 
international remittances positively. This implies selectivity on schooling in the 
migration decision, with the less educated migrating internally and the more educated 
  8migrating internationally. This conclusion, of course, depends on the presumption that 
schooling of the household head is a good proxy for the schooling of migrant 
household members. Family size and landholdings do not have statistically significant 
effects on per-capita remittances. The geographic differences in migration patterns are 
also visible here, with domestic remittances lower in the Santo Domingo area, and 
international remittances lower in rural areas and higher in the Santiago area (the 
secondary urban center in the Dominican Republic). 
The estimated regression coefficients can now be used in order to further 
decompose the part of income inequality that operates through remittances. Morduch 
and Sicular (2002) and Fields (2003) suggested a regression-based inequality 
decomposition by income determinants. In particular, total household income is 
specified as a linear regression: 
 
(4)  y=Xβ+ε,  
 
where X is a matrix of explanatory variables, β is a vector of coefficients, and ε is a 
vector of residuals. Given a vector of consistently estimated coefficients b, income 
can be expressed as a sum of predicted income and a prediction error according to: 
 
(5)  y = Xb+e.
  
 
Substituting (5) into (1) and dividing through by I(y), the share of inequality attributed 






Arayama et al. (2006) develop this decomposition method further in order to 
differentiate between contributions of explanatory variables through different income 
sources. In particular, they specify the k
th source-specific income-generating function 
as: 
 
(7)  yk = Xβk+εk,  
 
  9where βk could include zero elements corresponding to explanatory variables that do 
not affect the k’th source of income. Since y = Σkyk = XΣkβk + Σkεk, using consistent 
estimates bk of βk and substituting into (1), the share of inequality attributed to 






This can be broken down to source-specific contributions of each explanatory variable 
to overall inequality, denoted s







  The tobit coefficients in table 4 are used for bk in (8). The results are in table 5. 
Recall that the contributions of domestic and international remittances to total income 
inequality were negative and positive, respectively (table 1). Table 5 shows that these 
contributions are mostly driven by the distributions of schooling and geographical 
location. The distribution of family size, on the other hand, contributes positively to 
inequality through both domestic and international remittances, while the distribution 
of landholdings (in particular, households with and without land) contributes 
negatively to inequality through both domestic and international remittances.  
  Another way to look at the impact of explanatory variables on inequality is 
through marginal effects. We use simulations to compute marginal effects in the 
following way. First, we make a change in an explanatory variable. Then, we use the 
regression coefficients in order to predict the resulting change in income from 
remittances. Finally, we compute the level of inequality of total income after 
incorporating this change. The changes in the explanatory variables used in this case 
are the following. Family size is increased by one person for the whole sample, 
landholdings per capita are increased by 1%, and each of the categorical variables is 
changed to 1 for the whole sample. Note that the results are not comparable to those 
reported in table 3. There, remittance income was increased by 1% for all rural 
households (for example), while here, remittance income of urban households is 
changed as if they were rural. Also, in the case of the categorical variables, the 
simulation obviously reduces the variance of the variable to zero, and hence the 
results are not independent of the inequality contributions reported in table 5. 
  10However, note that the variance can be reduced to zero by either changing the 
categorical variable to one or to zero, and the marginal effects are going to be of 
opposite signs in those two cases.  
The results are in table 6. Marginal effects of female-headed households, age 
above 50, and land ownership are negative for both domestic and international 
remittances. On the other hand, marginal effects of family size and landholdings are 
positive for both domestic and international remittances. The marginal effect of higher 
education is positive in the case of domestic remittances and negative in the case of 
international remittances, and the same is true for the marginal effects of the urban 
centers (Santo Domingo and Santiago). The marginal effect of rural households is 
negative in the case of domestic remittances and positive in the case of international 
remittances. 
  These results have a number of policy implications. Increasing the variance of 
schooling (by increasing schooling of households who are already more educated than 
the average) is expected to decrease domestic remittances and increase international 
remittances, probably through substitution of international migration for domestic 
migration. This is expected to increase income of these households, but since the 
impacts of schooling through domestic and international remittances are opposite in 
signs, the overall impact on income inequality is ambiguous. It depends on the initial 
position of these households within the income distribution. Similarly, migration of 
entire households from remote rural areas to central urban areas is expected to reduce 
domestic remittances and increase international remittances for these households, and 
the resulting effect on income inequality is ambiguous. A family planning policy that 
reduces fertility and therefore household size especially among the larger households 
is expected to reduce household size inequality, and according to table 5 this would 
reduce inequality through its impact on remittances. This policy would also reduce 
average household size and this would also reduce inequality through its effect on 
remittances (table 6). Hence, the impact of this policy on inequality (through 
remittances) is unambiguously negative. Finally, consider a land reform that allocates 
farmland to some landless households. This increases the variance of landlessness to 
the extent that less than half of the households own land, and hence reduces inequality 
according to table 5. This policy also reduces inequality according to table 6 because 
it increases the fraction of households with land. The bottom line seems to be 
  11unambiguous, but note that this policy would also change the distribution of 
landholdings per capita, and this could change the picture. 
 
Summary and conclusions 
  This paper used inequality decomposition techniques to analyze the 
differential roles of domestic and international remittances in determining household 
income inequality in the Dominican Republic. Decomposing total income inequality 
by income sources reveals that the variability of international remittances contributes 
positively to inequality, while the contribution of the variability of domestic 
remittances is negative. However, the marginal effect on inequality of a uniform 
increase in remittances is negative for both domestic and international remittances. 
Combining the results of the decomposition and the marginal effects, one can 
conclude that domestic remittances are more likely to be equalizing than international 
remittances. Breaking down the marginal effects by population sub-groups, we found 
that the negative marginal effect on inequality of domestic remittances is more 
prominent among rural households, and in particular among landless rural households, 
while the negative marginal effect on inequality of international remittances is more 
prominent among urban households, and in particular outside of the Santo Domingo 
area. Stronger marginal effects of remittances were also found among female-headed 
households, the elderly and the less educated. The conclusion is that the impact of 
remittances on inequality is far from being uniform across the population. 
  Analyzing the determinants of remittances, we found that both domestic and 
international remittances are higher among female-headed households and the elderly. 
Education seems to be associated with lower domestic remittances and higher 
international remittances, probably reflecting the role of education in promoting 
international versus domestic migration. Geographic differences in the levels of 
remittances are also observed. Breaking down the contributions of remittances to 
inequality into shares attributed to these inequality determinants, we found that an 
increase in schooling increases inequality through domestic remittances and decreases 
inequality through international remittances, while a reduction in household size is 
likely to reduce inequality through both domestic and international remittances. These 
results could be useful for policy evaluations. 
  The analysis of this paper highlights the importance of the distinction between 
domestic and international remittances as drivers of inequality in the case of the 
  12Dominican Republic. It also emphasized the importance of identifying and 
quantifying the determinants of remittances and their subsequent impact on inequality. 
Still, the analysis is partial in the sense that it does not explicitly model the incidence 
of remittances. Recall that a Tobit model was used to estimate the determinants of 
remittances, but the coefficients were used in the decomposition procedure as if 
remittances are not censored. A more complete analysis should evaluate the marginal 
effects of determinants of remittances on the incidence if remittances as well as their 
level. In addition, the analysis focused on remittances and somewhat neglected the 
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Figure 1: Growth, Remittances and Inequality in the Dominican Republic 
 
Sources:  
World Development Indicators 2006 (http://go.worldbank.org/RVW6YTLQH0). 
Missing inequality data was obtained from the Socio-Economic Database for Latin 
America and the Caribbean (CEDLAS and The World Bank, 
www.depeco.econo.unlp.edu.ar/cedlas/) 
 
  15Table 1. Inequality decomposition by income source 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
    Inequality measures 




income   Gini  Squared CV 
__________________________________________________________________ 
Inequality index    0.5149 2.4219 
      
Inequality contributions      
















Pensions, insurance and 












Total 100%  1.00  1.00 
Marginal effects      
















Pensions, insurance and 













Note: bootstrapped t-statistics in parentheses. 
  16Table 2. The distribution of income sources by population sub-groups 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 





area other  total  landed  landless 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Percentage of households  53 25  28  47  23  24 
Percentage of households 
with income from: 
          
Wage labor   67 73  60  56  51  61 
Self-employment   51 57  48  38  29  45 
Agriculture  12 2  25  55  91  24 
Family business   13  13  14  20  20  20 
Pensions, insurance and 
interest   39 43  34  22  16  27 
Domestic remittances  17  11  26  26  29  22 
International remittances  39  40  36  21  21  21 
Percentage of household 
income from: 
          
Wage labor   40 39  41  30  21  39 
Self-employment   37 38  37  27  17  37 
Agriculture  2 1  1  23  44  2 
Family business   8  10  9  9  7  12 
Pensions, insurance and 
interest   5 5  6  2  1  2 
Domestic remittances  1  0  1  2  2  2 
International remittances  7  6  6  6  8  4 
Total   100  100  100  100  100  100 
____________________________________________________________________ 
Continued on next page 
  17Table 2. (continued) 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
 Gender*  Age*  Schooling* 
     _____________ 
  Male  Female  Up to 50  51 plus Up to 8  9 plus 
___________________________________________________________________ 
Percentage of households  78 22  61  39 78 22 
Percentage of households 
with income from: 
        
Wage labor   64 55  67  55 59 73 
Self-employment   47 40  49  39 43 53 
Agriculture  36 15  28  37 36 14 
Family business   17  14  17  15  17  14 
Pensions, insurance and 
interest   31 32  28  36 27 46 
Domestic remittances  18  33  14  31  25  8 
International remittances  25  48  28  34  29  37 
Percentage of household 
income from: 
        
Wage labor   36 44  32  32 29 37 
Self-employment   36 23  32  25 25 36 
Agriculture  9 2  6  8  10  1 
Family business   9  6  10  3  7  7 
Pensions, insurance and 
interest   4 5  2  6 3 5 
Domestic remittances  1  4  1  2  2  0 
International remittances  5  16  5  7  6  4 
Total   100  100  100  100  100  100 
____________________________________________________________________ 
* Gender, age and schooling relate to the head of household.
  18Table 3. Breaking down the marginal effects of remittances on inequality  
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
  Domestic remittances  International remittances 
 ____________________  ______________________ 
  Gini  Squared CV Gini  Squared CV 
__________________________________________________________________ 














































































































Bootstrapped t-statistics in parentheses.  
Age and schooling are of the head of household. 
 
  19Table 4. Tobit results 
____________________________________________________________________ 
 
    ln(remittances per capita) 
   ______________________ 
Explanatory variable 
Sample 
mean   Domestic  International 
__________________________________________________________________ 












































Sigma   8.03  7.89 
Pseudo R
2   0.0515  0.0333 
Likelihood ratio    126.83**  105.56** 
Number of observations    1089  1089 
% censored    79%  69% 
____________________________________________________________________ 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 




  Domestic remittances  International remittances 
 ____________________ ____________________ 
Explanatory variable  Gini   CV
2  Gini   CV
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Bootstrapped t-statistics in parentheses.  
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  Domestic remittances  International remittances 
 ____________________ ____________________ 
Explanatory variable  Gini   CV
2  Gini   CV
2 
__________________________________________________________________ 
Female-headed household  -5.072% -9.917% -14.922% -28.889% 
Age above 50  -3.251% -6.513% -4.859% -9.790% 
Schooling 1 to 8 years  -0.323% -1.453% -2.963%  -4.177% 
Schooling above 8 years  5.027% 9.216% -7.709%  -13.135% 
Family size  0.407% 0.802% 0.869%  1.712% 
Household with land  -0.596% -1.303% -6.823%  -14.998% 
ln(landholdings per capita)  0.002% 0.005% 0.016%  0.031% 
Rural  -0.274% -0.717% 6.700% 16.121% 
Santo Domingo area  3.973% 6.990% -5.359% -9.043% 
Santiago area  1.305% 1.659% -11.097% -19.513% 
____________________________________________________________________ 
Notes: 
All marginal effects are highly significant; t-values were suppressed.  
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